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Abstract Experiments on second-price sealed-bid private value auctions have
established that subjects typically bid more than their value, despite the fact that value
bidding is a dominant strategy in such auctions. Moreover, the laboratory evidence
shows that subjects do not learn to bid their values as they gain more experience. In the
present paper, we re-examine the second-price auction data from Kagel and Levin’s
(Econ J 103:868–879, 1993) classic paper. We find that auction efficiency increases
over time, even though the frequency of overbidding is unchanged. We argue that the
rise in efficiency is due to a decline in the variability of overbidding. This is consistent
with subjects’ learning to bid more like each other.
Keywords Bidding · Efficiency · Second price auction
1 Introduction
In a second-price sealed-bid auction with private values, the highest bidder wins the
auction and pays the second highest bid. In such auctions, it is a dominant strategy for
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a bidder to bid his value.1 One of the striking results to come from the experimental
literature on second price auctions (SPAs) is that subjects have a strong tendency to
bid more than their value. In 5-bidder auctions, for example, Kagel and Levin (1993)
find that over two-thirds of all bids exceed the bidder’s value. Kagel et al. (1987) find
that the market price (the second highest bid) exceeds the second highest value in 80%
of their SPAs. Further evidence of overbidding is reported in Harstad (2000).
These papers report, moreover, that there is little evidence that subjects learn to
bid their values. Kagel and Levin (1993) note that: “Learning to play the dominant
strategy is quite limited as only 2 out of 21 subjects play it precisely for 5 or more
consecutive periods starting from the end of the auction series.” 2 Kagel et al. (1987)
report “… no obvious tendency for prices to converge to the dominant bid price over
time was observed.” 3
In the present paper we re-examine the data from Kagel and Levin (1993). We show
that there is a strong tendency for auction efficiency to rise over time. In particular,
by the end of their experiment, the second-price auction assigns the item to the bidder
with the highest value with probability .95 or higher. Even when the item is misallo-
cated, the surplus lost tends to be small, with the auction capturing, on average, nearly
99% of the theoretical surplus. Hence, even though bidding is not converging to value
bidding, as subjects gain experience SPAs perform remarkably well. In particular,
bidding behavior changes over time, in a way that leads to higher efficiency.
Our measures of auction efficiency use a technique known as recombinant esti-
mation.4 We begin by first forming the empirical distribution of bid-value pairs. (For
each period there are 20 such pairs for Kagel and Levin’s second-price auctions.) We
then consider all possible groups of five bidders and the corresponding five bid-value
pairs and, for each group, we compute whether the bidder with the highest bid also has
the highest value. The fraction of groups for which the highest bidder has the highest
value is our measure of the probability that the bidder with the highest value wins.
This technique is closely related to a statistical technique known as bootstrapping
(Efron and Tibshirani 1993). In our context, bootstrapping would involve repeatedly
drawing random groups of five bidders, with replacement, and computing average
efficiency from the realized groups. The approach we use involves sampling without
replacement. In addition, using techniques described in Bergstrom et al. (2009), we are
able to compute estimates that are based on all possible combinations. This is referred
to as exact recombination and is analogous to ideal bootstrapping. Exact recombina-
tion produces an unbiased estimate and is appropriate for making an inference about
the sample population. For further discussion see Bergstrom et al. (2009).
One could, of course, simply measure efficiency in the Kagel and Levin data based
on the four groups of five bidders that actually formed in the experiment. Such
an approach seems unnatural given that bidders are randomly assigned to groups.
1 In other words, a bidder’s payoff to placing a bid equal to his value for the item is at least as great as his
payoff to placing any other bid, regardless of the other bids submitted.
2 See Kagel and Levin (1993, p. 872, fn. 5).
3 See Kagel and Roth (1995, ch. 5) for a survey of the experimental literature on auctions.
4 Mitzkewitz and Nagel (1993) and Mehta et al. (1994) use recombinant estimation on data from bargaining
and coordination games, respectively.
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Table 1 Kagel and Levin
(1993) Second Price Auctions Auction Number of Bidders per Auction
session Subjects Auction Periods
2.1 10 5 1–12
5 and 10 13–24
2.2 10 5 1–13
10 14–25
5 26–35
Furthermore, recombinant estimation produces an estimate of efficiency that has a
lower standard error, in a sense made precise in Mullin and Reiley (2006), than the
estimate that is based on the groups actually formed during the experiment to determine
payoffs.
We argue that the explanation for rising efficiency is that the variance of overbids
falls over time. 5 Hence, even though bidders continue to overbid, the bidder with the
highest value becomes increasingly likely to have the highest bid. A falling variance
in overbids is consistent with bidders tending to all overbid by a similar amount—they
learn to bid more like each other.
2 Kagel and Levin’s Data on Second-Price Auctions
Our analysis is based on the second-price auction experiments reported in Kagel and
Levin (1993).6 Each experiment had ten subjects. In each period, each subject’s value
was randomly drawn from the uniform distribution on $0 to $28.30. The subjects then
participated in a second-price sealed-bid auction in a market with either five or ten
bidders. After each auction, subjects observed the bids and values of the other sub-
jects in their group, along with the profit (or loss) of the winner. Any profits (losses)
were added to (subtracted from) the subject’s current cash balance. Subjects were
given an initial cash balance of $10. A subject who went bankrupt in the course of the
experiment was removed.
The experimental design for the second-price auctions is summarized in Table 1
above. Periods 13–24 of session 2.1 used a “dual market” procedure in which, using
the same value, a subject simultaneously bid in a market with five bidders and a market
with ten bidders. Session 2.2 used a “cross over” procedure in which subjects first bid
in a market with five bidders, and then bid in market with ten bidders.
We use the data from the five-bidder auctions. More specifically, we pooled, period
by period, the first 23 periods of bids in the five-bidder markets of Sessions 2.1 with the
23 periods (1–13 and 26–35) of bids from five-bidder markets of Session 2.2. (The bids
from period 24 of Session 2.1 are dropped since they have no counterpart in Session
2.2.) This gives us 23 periods of data with 20 observations per period. One could, of
5 Remember that efficiency does not require “value-bidding.” Everyone overbidding (or underbidding) by
the same amount also yields efficient allocations.
6 Kagel and Levin (1993) also report results from first- and third-price auctions, but here we restrict attention
to second-price auctions.
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Fig. 1 Frequency of under-, value-, and over-bids in the five bidder markets of Sessions 2.1 and 2.2.
course, analyze the data from Sessions 2.1 and 2.2 separately, rather than pooling the
data. However, such an approach would diminish the value of recombinant estimation,
increasing the standard error of the efficiency estimates, and obscuring any time trends
in efficiency. Since there is a limited amount of data for ten-bidder auctions, we ignore
these auctions.
K&L documented that there was (1) a strong tendency for subjects to bid above
their values, with nearly two-thirds of all bids being overbids, and there was (2) no
tendency for subjects to learn to bid their values over time. Figure 1 illustrates these
conclusions by showing the frequency of “under bids,” “value bids,” and “over bids”
across time. Here, as in K&L, a bid is classified as an overbid if it is more that 5 cents
above the bidder’s value, it is an underbid if it is more than 5 cents below his value,
and it is a value bid otherwise.
K&L convincingly argue that the lack of convergence towards value bidding is
a result of the weak learning incentives in second-price auctions. They report for
the five-bidder market that, conditional on winning the auction, a subject lost money
only one-quarter of the time. Hence, subjects generally made money when they won,
whether they had overbid or not.
3 Convergence to Efficiency
Figure 1 shows that subjects do not learn to value bid, at least as K&L defined it.
However, examining auction efficiency reveals that subjects are bidding differently
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Fig. 2 Efficiency over time in K&L’s five-bidder auctions
over time. Our measure of efficiency applies to an empirical distribution of bid-value
pairs. Consider a sample of n bid-value pairs that are formed by pairing the bid of
each of n subjects with the subject’s value. Given this sample, auction efficiency in a
market with k bidders is defined to be the probability that, in a random sample of k
of the n bid-value pairs, the highest of the k bids is paired with the highest of the k
values. It represents the probability that the auction is efficient (i.e., the bidder with the
highest value wins), when bidding behavior is described by the empirical distribution
of bid-value pairs. An equivalent way to think of this efficiency measure is that it
represents the fraction of the
J = n!
k!(n − k)!
possible different groups of k bidders that, if formed, would yield an efficient outcome
given their bids and values.
K&L’s data for markets with five bidders provide, for each of the 23 periods, an
empirical distribution of 20 bid-value pairs. Figure 2 plots auction efficiency, as defined
above, in a market with five bidders across the 23 periods. It is visually apparent that
efficiency tends to rise over time. In a regression of efficiency against time (see Col-
umn (a) of Table 2), the estimated slope of .008 is statistically significant (p-value of
.002), and suggests that efficiency rises by approximately .8% each period. (The fitted
regression line is also shown in Fig. 2).
An alternative, but related, measure of efficiency is expected lost surplus. Expected
lost surplus is the expected difference between the highest bidder’s value and the
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Table 2 Regression Results
Dependent Variable Efficiency (a) Overbid (b) Squared Residuals from (b) (c)
Constant 0.773(0.031)** 1.295(0.172)** 6.632(1.424)**
Period 0.008(0.002)** −0.027(0.013)* −0.289(0.104)**
Observations 23 457 457
R squared 0.3130 0.0100 0.0174
Adj. R squared 0.0729 0.0078 0.0152
Standard errors are in parenthesis. ** and * denote significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively.
highest value, in a random sample of five of the 20 bid-value pairs. It measures how
much surplus is lost, on average, as a result of the item being allocated inefficiently.
Once again, consider forming the J = 20!/[5!(20 − 5)!] possible groups of five bid-
ders out of 20 bidders in each period, and index the different groups by j. For each
group j ( j = 1, . . ., J ) let v∗j denote the highest value of a bidder in group j, and let
v∗∗j denote the value of the bidder with the highest bid in group j. Expected lost surplus









Figure 3 shows that expected lost surplus (measured on the left-vertical axis) falls
quite quickly. In the first third, second third, and last third of the experiment the aver-
age expected loss is $.67, $.25, and $.08. Hence, the expected loss from inefficient
allocations becomes small.
The right-vertical axis of Fig. 3 shows the (expected) surplus captured as a percent-








and it is essentially above 99% over the last third of the experiment. Figure 3 shows that
by the last third of the experiment the second-price sealed-bid auction is performing
well, losing only a small amount of surplus in absolute terms, and capturing nearly
all surplus in percentage terms. It shows that the failure over time of subjects to bid
their dominant strategy largely does not undermine the theoretical efficiency of the
second-price auction.
4 Understanding Rising Efficiency
While subjects do not learn to value bid, Figs. 2 and 3 demonstrate that auction
efficiency and the percentage of surplus captured are both rising, while expected lost
surplus falls. In this section we investigate the changes in bidding behavior that explain
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Fig. 3 Expected lost surplus in K&L’s five-bidder auctions
these trends. In our analysis of the data we drop three very large overbids, made by
the same subject. Including them would have a large effect on the regression results
since each of these overbids is more than $26, while the mean absolute deviation from
value bidding (excluding these overbids) is $1.30 overall. Since the subject had high
values when making these overbids, dropping them has little effect on the efficiency
statistics displayed in Figs. 2 and 3.7
The first feature of the data is that there is a small tendency for the mean overbid
to decline over time. Column (b) of Table 2 reports the results of regressing overbids
against time. It shows that overbids decrease by about 2.7 cents per period, and this
effect is statistically significant. Declining overbids, however, do not explain rising
efficiency. If, for example, every subject overbid by the same amount, then efficiency
would be 1, and constant across time, even if the amount of the overbid were falling
over time.
More insight into rising efficiency can be obtained by examining the squared resid-
uals of the regression from (b). The squared residuals are a measure of the variance
of overbids, under the hypothesis that the mean overbid is declining according to the
regression results that are reported in (b). Column (c) of Table 2 shows that the squared
residuals, and hence the variance of overbids, are falling over time, and this effect is
statistically significant. The auction allocation is inefficient when the bidder with the
highest value doesn’t have the highest bid. This becomes less likely as the variance of
7 The three dropped bids (in periods 14, 16, and 17) were all of exactly $55.00. Efficiency in these periods
was, respectively, .77, .94, and .88. Excluding these bids yields efficiencies of .82, .93, and .97, respectively.
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overbids falls, and hence the decline in the variance of overbids explains the rise in
auction efficiency.
5 Concluding Remarks
The seller of an item may be interested in seeing that the item is allocated efficiently
i.e., that the bidder who values the item most highly wins it. In government auctions
of radio frequency spectrum or auctions of rights to drill for oil, for example, allo-
cative efficiency may be of greater interest than revenue maximization. The results
we report here suggest that despite the failure of subjects to follow their dominant
strategy of bidding their values, second-price sealed-bid auctions nonetheless yield
highly efficient outcomes.
Moreover, we have discovered a previously unrecognized feature of Kagel and
Levin’s second-price auction data: auction efficiency in a second-price sealed-bid
auction rises over time. The explanation for this phenomenon appears to be that while
bidders in second-price auctions do not learn to bid optimally over time, they do learn
to bid more like each other. It is the reduction in the variability of overbids that leads
to increased efficiency. Our findings call for further research into the robustness of
learning and rising efficiency in second-price auctions.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncom-
mercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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